Snapshot

France's long military presence in the Sahel, from Operation Serval to Barkhane, was intended to contain Islamist extremists threatening regional stability and, by extension, Europe's security. Yet since 2022, a cascade of Sahelian states—Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and even Senegal—have torn up defence agreements, expelled French bases, or cooled relations altogether. Domestic anger at Paris and resurgent nationalism have shrunk France's leverage in what was once its unquestioned sphere of influence.

President Macron's January 2025 lament that many Sahel states had "forgotten to say thank you," and his claim that "none of them" would be sovereign without French troops, distilled the very accusations of neo-colonialism and paternalism that leaders and citizens in the region now hurl back at Paris.

The Sahel is in the throes of a sovereignty movement. Nationalism and demands for equal partnerships are reshaping politics and even driving military coups. Whether in mining contracts or security pacts, the appetite for one-sided deals has withered. France's support for unpopular regimes, the lingering colonial echo of the CFA franc, and a habit of dismissing grassroots sentiment have together eroded its geostrategic clout.

Blaming Russia or branding this shift as mere populism would miss the point. What Paris faces is a reckoning of its own making.

In response to diminished clout, France is pivoting toward English-speaking Africa, especially Nigeria. Africa's most populous country and France's top trading partner in the sub-region offers markets, investment opportunities, and foreign-policy weight. President Bola Tinubu's frequent visits to Paris have already produced agreements worth about €300 million spanning infrastructure, agriculture, renewable energy, health, and human-capital development.

Beneath the obvious economic incentives, France is seeking renewed diplomatic credibility and security cooperation. For Nigeria, the challenge is to court this partnership without sacrificing its Afrocentric posture or alienating neighbors wary of French influence.

Yet even amid anti-French sentiment, the Sahel cannot fully disentangle itself. French remains the language of instruction, commerce, and administration, a reminder of Paris's deep imprint. To repair its reputation, France must recalibrate, matching its rhetoric to today's sovereignty-minded realities and shedding the paternalistic tone that lingers.

France has two main pathways to rebuild its standing in West Africa. The first is a soft approach focused on scholarships, cultural immersion, and socio-cultural promotion through institutions like the Alliance Française. The second is a strategic pivot that treats Abuja as the subregion's key integrator, particularly as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (the AES bloc) have left ECOWAS and expelled French forces. This requires building security cooperation and economic partnerships through Nigeria and coastal states rather than bypassing them. Instead of bases, France must improve intelligence to counter disinformation and mercenary networks. Effective implementation would benefit from independent analytical support, particularly in areas such as sentiment tracking, incident verification, and narrative monitoring.

Despite its growing closeness with Nigeria, France must tread carefully. Domestic pressures and sub-regional dynamics compel Abuja to balance its role as a stabilizing force in West Africa with the sensitivities of aligning too closely with Paris.